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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Arthur Rollin*

An Untested Speedometer Plus a Police
Officer's Estimate of Speed Sufficient to Convict on Speeding Violation-The defendant was
arrested for exceeding the speed limit in a 40
m.p.h. zone. At the trial, the arresting police
officer testified that he had observed the defendant's car for a distance of 2Y/2 miles, and
for one quarter-mile stretch he was approximately 100 yards behind the defendant. During
this sustained period, the untested speedometer
on the patrol car registered 64 m.p.h. In addition, the officer testified that he had been
estimating the speed of cars for over 18 years,
and his estimates had usually come within five
miles of the speed shown by radar devices and
speedometers. On the other hand, the defendant
testified that during the time he was followed
by the officer, his speedometer registered approximately 40 m.p.h., and that he later had
his speedometer tested and it proved accurate.
The defendant was found guilty of speeding
and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed,
holding that the evidence sustained the conviction. People v. Heyser, 2 N.Y. 2d 390, 141
N.E.2d 553 (1957).
The court indicated that evidence supplied
by an untested speedometer alone would not
have been enough to sustain the conviction,
and cited many cases involving untested speedometers where convictions were not sustained.
The court noted, however, that in such cases
"there was no evidence in the record as to the
expertise of the patrolman in judging speed, ...
or the patrolman did not have an adequate
opportunity for observation of the defendant's
car." Thus, since there was adequate opportunity to observe the defendant's car, the testifying officer was qualified to estimate speeds,
and the speed estimated was 20 m.p.h. over
the limit, the judgement was affirmed.
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.

The lone dissenter, Judge Van Voorhis, felt
that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence Obtained Through Seizure of
Entire Contents of House Inadmissible-Two
fugitives from justice were discovered living in
a secluded cabin by F.B.I. agents, and were
arrested outside the cabin by the agents who
had warrants for their arrest. Then, the agents
went into the cabin and arrested, without
warrant, two persons found inside the cabin.
The cabin was thoroughly searched and its
entire contents were seized by the agents, who
did not have a search warrant. The property
seized was taken about two hundred miles
away to an F.B.I. office for examination, and
some of the material found was used as evidence
against the defendants. The court of appeals
affirmed their conviction, with one judge
dissenting. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial
holding, over the dissent of two judges, that
the evidence seized from the cabin was inadmissible. Kremen v. United Stales, 77 S. Ct. 828
(1957).
The Court said that the seizure of the entire
contents of a house and removing it two
hundred miles was "beyond the sanction" of
any case. On the other hand, the dissenting
opinion expressed the view that the evidence
was legally seized and that legality of a seizure
should not be predicated upon the quantity of
goods seized. In addition, since only a small
portion of the items seized were introduced
into evidence, the dissent said that even if the
items were inadmissible the conviction still
should be affirmed because there was other
admissible evidence sufficient to prove the
guilt of the defendants. Thus, the rule of harmless error should have been applied to sustain
the verdict.
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Illegal Entry Rendered Evidence Subsequently Found Outside House InadmissibleAfter receiving information that a known prostitute and drug addict was using narcotics at
the defendant's house, two officers went there
without a search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Upon arriving at the house, in which some of
the rooms were occupied by persons other than
the defendant, the officers opened the front
door and took a few steps into the first floor
hallway after no one answered their knock on
the door. The defendant then walked past the
officers and out the front door, across the porch
down the front steps, and to a trash can located under the porch. There, she acted as
though she was placing something into the
trash can, but the officers, who had followed
her outside, saw nothing in her hand. Shortly
thereafter, one of the officers looked in the
trash can and removed a phial of pills that
later proved to be narcotics. At the defendant's
trial, the phial and its contents were introduced
as evidence against the defendant over her
motion to suppress the evidence, and she was
convicted of concealing narcotics known to have
been illegally imported. The court of appeals
reversed the conviction, with one judge dissenting, holding that the above mentioned
evidence was inadmissible because it was
obtained as a result of an unreasonable search
and seizure. Work v. United States, 243 F.2d
660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
The court was of the opinion that the entry
of the officers into the house of the defendant
without any warrant was illegal because, even
though occupied by others, it was her private
home, and the hallway the officers entered was
an integral part of that home, not a public or
semi-public lobby or entrance.. In addition, the
court found that the placing of the phial of
narcotics in the trash can by the defendant was
the direct result of the illegal entry. The court
also rejected the government's argument that
the placing of the phial in the trash can outside
the house, where it would be accessible to the
trash collector, was an abandonment. The court
stated that since the trash can was under the
porch, there was an abandonment only to
those who had actual or implied authority to
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remove the contents of the trash can. Thus,
the act of placing the phial in the can was in
essence a "hiding" of an object within the
"curtilage or 'general enclosure surrounding
the dwelling'."
The dissent indicated that the defendant's
"home" was in reality a rooming house and the
officers were seeking one of its tenants. Thus,
the hallway that the officers entered was a
semi-public entrance where, according to the
dissent, callers on the tenants of the rooming
house had a right to be. Consequently, the
entry by the officers was not illegal and the
search was not unreasonable. The dissent
stated that "reasonableness is determined
neither by a piecemeal examination of the
facts nor by application of rigid formulas; the
question must be resolved upon an appraisal
of the 'total atmosphere of the case' ". Also,
the dissent objected to basing the admissibility
of evidence on the subjective test of what was
the motive behind the defendant's discarding
of the phial. Furthermore, the dissent pointed
out that the Supreme Court has emphasized
that there is a difference in degree of protection
afforded rightfully possessed private property
and such items as customs contraband, stolen
goods, and counterfeit money. Thus, the reremoval of narcotics from a trash can accessible
to the public should not have been protected.
Taking of Blood Sample Without Consent is
not an Unreasonable Search and SeizureMoving at a high rate of speed, the defendant's
car ran off the highway and into the bank of
an irrigation ditch. When the ambulance driver,
who was also the coroner of the county, arrived
at the scene of the accident, he found beer
cans on the floor of the defendant's car, and
the smell of alcohol on his breath. A highway
patrolman requested the driver to obtain a
sample of the defendant's blood for an alcohol
test, and the driver asked the defendant for
permission. The driver testified that he could
not remember the exact answer of the defenddant, but that at the time he was extremely
ill. However, when a nurse attempted to take a
sample of the defendant's blood, the defendant
withdrew his arm and the sample was taken

19571

POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES

only after the driver held the defendant's arm.
The blood sample of the defendant was tested
and showed an alcohol content of .22%. At
the trial an expert testified that a person is
under the influence of alcohol when the alcohol content of his blood reaches .15% and that
the person from whom the blood sample was
taken was not capable of operating an automobile. The defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and causing personal injury, a felony. The California Supreme Court
with one judge dissenting, affirmed the conviction and held that the extraction of the
defendant's blood was not an unreasonable
search and seizure, even assuming that the
defendant had not consented to the taking of
the blood sample. People v. Duroncelay, 312
P. 2d., 690 (Cal. 1957).
The court said that because of the circumstances involved, the admissibility of the blood
sample must be considered as though the defendant failed to give his consent to the taking
of the sample. The court pointed out that previous cases have held that the admission in
evidence of the results of an involuntary blood
test is not a violation of due process, and that
the privilege against self-incrimination is not
applicable to the present situation, because it
does not apply to real evidence. Thus, the
court was faced solely with the question of

whether or not the result of the blood test
could be excluded on the grounds that it was
obtained as a result of an unreasonable search
and seizure. The court noted that California
has recently adopted the rule that evidence
obtained through an unreasonable search and
seizure is not admissible in a court of law. The
court recognized that the taking of blood for a
test is an every day occurrence and since the
defendant's blood was extracted under adequate
medical supervision by a registered nurse, the
extraction was not brutal or shocking. The
court stated that "so long as the measures
adopted do not amount to a substantial invasion of individual rights, society must not
be prevented from seeking to combat" the
public hazard created by the intoxicated driver.
Thus, because of the "scientific reliability of
blood alcohol tests in establishing guilt or
innocence", the public interest involved, and
the fact that the blood was extracted in a
medically approved manner, the court stated
that the taking of a sample of the defendant's
blood without his consent was not an unreasonable search and seizure.
The dissent stated that taking a blood sample
without consent of the defendant was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
his constitutional rights, and also a denial of
the privilege against self-incrimination.

(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 312-314, supra.)

